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ABSTRACT
Settler colonialism is structured in part according to the principle of
civilizational progress yet the roots of this doctrine are not well
understood. Disparate ideas of progress and practices related to
colonial dispossession and domination can be traced back to the
Enlightenment, and as far back as ancient Greece, but there
remain unexplored logics and continuities. I argue that
civilizational progress and settler colonialism are structured
according to the opposition between politics governed by reason
or faith and the ﬁgure of the child as sinful or bestial. Thus, it is
not contingent, but rather necessary that justiﬁcatory frameworks
of European empire and colonialism depict Indigenous peoples as
children. To illustrate how the theoretical link between Indigenous
peoples and children emerges not as a simple analogy, but rather,
as the source of the premodern/modern and savage/civilized
binaries, I trace the various historical iterations of the political/
childhood opposition through the classical, medieval,
enlightenment, and modern eras. I show how the model of
civilizational progress from a premodern and savage state of
childhood continues to serve as the model for settler colonial
exclusion and domination of Indigenous peoples.
KEYWORDS
Settler colonialism; progress;
childhood; history of political
thought
The violence of settler colonial dispossession and assimilation ﬂows historically from civi-
lizational precepts such as Manifest Destiny, terra nullius, the white man’s burden and the
Doctrine of Discovery. Although formally rejected by modern governments, these prin-
ciples are nevertheless preserved in the legal and political systems of contemporary
settler colonial states. The ﬁgure at the heart of these colonial doctrines is the ‘Indian’,
often understood as an incarnation of the ancient Greek and Roman category of the
foreign barbarian whose conquest was an enduring imperial ambition.1 Yet the concep-
tualization of the ‘Indian’ in the context of New World settler colonialism differs signiﬁ-
cantly from this classiﬁcation. Whereas the category of the barbarian reﬂected an
ancient imperial mandate to pursue glory through conquest and slavery, the idea of the
‘Indian’ is distinguished by the modern colonial mandates of civilizational progress
through dispossession and education. I argue in the following that Indigenous peoples
are not conceptualized primarily as barbarian opponents of empire, but rather, the
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‘Indian’ is constructed according to the ancient conception of the degraded, not fully
human, child. In the following, I use the term misopedy to refer to the denigration
and subordination of children and childhood.2 Misopedy is an ancient form of social
and political hierarchy. Despite the fact that ‘European xenophobic traditions such as
anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Negrophobia are considerably older than race’,3 miso-
pedy appears to be older still. The idea of a telos of progress from animal child to
human adult is both a historical and conceptual antecedent of the idea of European civi-
lization, preﬁguring its stories about maturation and progress from cultural ignorance to
enlightenment.
While analyses of how race and gender relate to coloniality provide valuable insights,4
contemporary processes of settler colonial dispossession and assimilation can only be fully
understood through the lens of misopedy. Just as the adult was conceptualized in contra-
distinction to the child as an ontological ‘other’, the ‘Indian’ came to be situated as the
other of the European.5 The eighteenth-century historian, Frederich von Schiller, provides
a classic illustration of how Indigenous peoples were constructed as savage ‘Indians’
through their classiﬁcation as children:
The discoveries which our European seafarers have made in distant oceans and on remote
shores afford us a spectacle which is as instructive as it is entertaining. They show us societies
arrayed around us at various levels of development, as an adult might be surrounded by chil-
dren of different ages, reminded by their example of what he himself once was and whence he
started. A wise hand seems to have preserved these savage tribes until such time as we have
progressed sufﬁciently in our own civilization to make useful application of this discovery, and
from this mirror to recover the lost beginning of our race. But how embarrassing and dismal is
the picture of our own childhood presented in these peoples!6
In his nineteenth-century commentary on Chief Pontiac, Francis Parkman (whom Roy
Harvey Pearce called ‘the prime historian of the victory of civilization over savagism’) pro-
vides another instructive passage on the ‘Indian’ constructed as child:
Pontiac was a thorough savage, and in him stand forth, in strongest light and shadow, the
native faults and virtues of the Indian race. All children, says Sir Walter Scott, are naturally
liars; and truth and honor are developments of later education.7
Even here, in the late eighteenth century, the construction of the native is not essen-
tially a racial project. In the same way that Schiller depicted native ‘races’ as peoples emer-
ging from civilizational childhood, Parkman is also clear that the virtues and vices of the
native are found in all feral children of civilization, including white European ancestors,
irrespective of race:
Barbarism is to civilization what childhood is to maturity; and all savages, whatever may be
their country, their color, or their lineage, are prone to treachery and deceit. The barbarous
ancestors of our own frank and manly race are no less obnoxious to the charge than those
of the cat-like Bengalee; for in this childhood of society brave men and cowards are treacher-
ous alike.8
The colonial denial of full humanity usually takes two forms. The ﬁrst is totalizing
and involves the depiction of peoples as non-human animals, insects, or vermin.9 We
ﬁnd this discourse most ominously deployed in the context of physical genocide.
The second functions much differently for it not only justiﬁes the use of coercion
and violence but frames it as an obligatory means of inducing maturity – of motivating
SETTLER COLONIAL STUDIES 61
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
rit
ish
 C
olu
mb
ia 
Li
br
ary
] a
t 1
3:3
5 2
6 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
feral or premodern peoples along the natural telos of humanity towards the fulﬁlment
of a normative ideal of progress. The result is a form of cultural genocide. In the context
of contemporary settler colonialism, it is this second form of denial that demands
greater analysis.
Re-imagining Indigenous peoples as ‘Indians’ was crucial in legitimizing colonial claims
to territorial sovereignty.10 The dual colonial mandates of dispossession and paciﬁcation
were advanced by modelling Indigenous peoples – legally and politically – according to
the only existing class of people in Western thought for whom there existed a moral obli-
gation to provide assistance but for whom political claims were impossible: children.
Through this speciﬁc classiﬁcation, a number of colonial functions that could not be
accomplished by racial, ethnic, linguistic, or geographical distinctions alone were
advanced. Colonial actors were fundamentally concerned with disqualifying Indigenous
peoples as political agents with sufﬁcient intelligence or reason to form political commu-
nities with legitimate claims to nationhood, land, and sovereignty. As Patrick Wolfe
observes: ‘Indigenous North Americans were not killed, driven away, romanticized, assimi-
lated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the original owners of the land
but as Indians.’11 Securing resource extraction, trade, commerce, and governance – Euro-
pean benchmarks of cultural progress – proved nearly impossible without paciﬁcation of
Indigenous territories, a goal best served by the coerced education and assimilation of the
‘Indian’ in Christian faith and/or Enlightenment reason. The hierarchy and violence embo-
died in the forced removal and education was justiﬁed according to the doctrine of civi-
lizational progress out of childhood.12
Who is the child?
In most Western traditions, ‘childhood’ is a social category constructed around the phys-
iological and cognitive differences that characterize the early life of human beings. The
category of child is comprised of a set of ideas and imaginaries that organize how older
people think and act in relation to young people.13 The differences between young and
older (like the differences between black and white, male and female) are socially (re)con-
structed to form a binary opposition between ‘child’ and ‘adult’. Speciﬁcally, the child is
characterized by the absence of distinctly human agency, a ‘childhood animality’ standing
in contradistinction to the (ideally) autonomous rationally motivated action of the fully
human adult.14 Children are not simply human beings with different ways of interacting
with the world and others, they are a lesser, deﬁcient, or otherwise incomplete form of
human being.
This formulation has remained constant from its origins in ancient Greece to today. The
renowned French historian of childhood, Philippe Ariès, argued that the Western con-
ception of childhood did not emerge until roughly the sixteenth century. For Ariès, the
idea that childhood is a distinct phase of life, along with the emergence of new institutions
designed to protect and educate children, were shifts associated with the rise of moder-
nity.15 Ariès asserted that prior to the modern era, young people were viewed as miniature
adults who were treated with relative indifference, evidenced in part by the changing
depiction of children in European art from undersized adults to schoolchildren. Ariès’
critics have correctly argued that there has always been recognition of the unique charac-
ter of childhood in contrast to adulthood.16 Despite shifting conceptions of childhood
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inferiority, the child has been consistently understood as a subordinate and only partially
human being who must be guided into maturity through education.17 What distinguishes
the modern conception of the child, then, is the shift out of a medieval idea of progress
through education in faith to the Enlightenment ideal of perfectibility through education
in reason.18 From its earliest formulations adulthood is viewed as an inherently political
existence understood in opposition to a child’s non-political or pre-political way of being.19
Civilizational homology
Before I present the historical development of coloniality, I would like to clarify why the
identiﬁcation of Indigenous cultures with children is not just a paternalistic analogy or
just one among many contingent tropes of colonial superiority. The relationship is not
simply rhetorical, as we see when Philip Deloria writes that child and the native are
‘paired rhetorically as natural, simple, naive, preliterate, and devoid of self-conscious-
ness’.20 Rather, the degraded ﬁgure of the child provides the internal structure and
logic of the colonial conception of the ‘Indian’. The rhetorical device of analogy works
by highlighting similarities that are coincidental rather than inherent. Analogy, like meta-
phor, does not entreat us to approach the objects of association as essentially the same
simply because they might appear the same. In this sense, analogy is distinct from hom-
ology. Homology pertains to shared processes or structures which are linked and can be
treated as identical despite other differences. The skeletal structure of the human hand, for
instance, is not analogous to the skeletal structure of a whale’s ﬂipper. Rather, they are
homologous because they share a common structure and a shared evolutionary origin
despite appearing different.
Ideological and philosophical processes can be structured homologously as well. When
writers invoke the image of organic biological growth or geologic change to illustrate
changes in individual and civilizational development they are deploying an analogy. Meta-
phors referring to the growth of plants do not invoke the same internal logic of progress
through education as the homology, nor the moral obligation to encourage progress
through the disciplining of children and, by extension, of Indigenous cultures. Within
the homology, children and Indigenous cultures progress from animal-human to fully
human through the identical mechanism of education in either faith or reason.21 In the
Western teleological account of reason, the mechanisms of development from, on the
one hand, child to adult, and, on the other hand, from premodern to modern, are fully
homologous. This is why, in the settler colonial framework, children and Indigenous cul-
tures are understood as the beneﬁciaries of violence: it is a moral requirement that
those in a superior and authoritative position oversee the transition of an inferior and sub-
ordinate state of being to a mature being.22 Educational discipline is unavoidable because
mere physiological development, the root of civilizational metaphor, does not guarantee
intellectual and civilizational progress. Thus, European powers have a responsibility to
educate Indigenous societies, a function of the civilizing mandate of misopedy according
to which adults are morally obligated to raise children out of the darkness of sin and
ignorance.
The origins of the homology pre-date oral and written records, but it might help to
consider some of the reasons why children have been subject to such subordination in
the ﬁrst place. One strong possibility is that an intellectually satisfying justiﬁcation was
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required to legitimize the various domestic economies, afﬂuence, and privileges that came
as a result of child labour. From at least the classical period up to the mid-nineteenth
century, children were used as free labour (often as expendable slaves) whose productivity
turned out to be central to the historical emergence of various agricultural and industrial
revolutions, including the rise of industrial capitalism.23 Adults were exploited and
enslaved as well, but the speed and intensity of economic growth in Europe could not
have be secured by adult labour alone. In nineteenth-century Britain, for example, children
constituted up to 50% of the work force in many industries.24 The material surpluses and
wealth produced through the forced labour of children have transformed Western society
numerous times. During these transformative epochs, many adults found themselves
released from the demands of subsistence labour as well as the care of children. The
wealth and leisure time established in part by child labour in ancient Greece as in
Modern Europe was devoted to the cultivation of religion, art, philosophy, politics, and
science. The subordination of an entire class of peoples according on their cognitive
immaturity was essential to the emergence of industrial capitalist modernity.25 Not surpris-
ingly, the principal beneﬁciaries of child exclusion and exploitation were responsible for
devising self-serving justiﬁcations for their new position and pastimes, ad hoc rationaliz-
ations of adult privilege based on the argument that philosophers and politicians were
not bound by necessity precisely because they were not the children who served and
laboured under them. While we cannot say with any certainty how children came to be
portrayed as the antithesis of the fully human political agent, it seems reasonable to
assume that these representations were rooted in the conditions under which adults ben-
eﬁtted from the child’s subjugation. With this in mind, let us turn to a historical discussion
of how the civilizational homology led to the dispossession and assimilation of Indigenous
peoples through their classiﬁcation as children.
Although the Western idea of civilizational progress would take many forms over time
(e.g. Christian, cultural, national, and scientiﬁc), each instantiation features the same deﬁn-
ing central logic: human beings, as individuals and as a species, progress out of a bestial
state into a fully human state through education.26 This central logic embodies a venera-
tion of logos, language and reason, as the deﬁnitively human form of relating to the world
and others, always and explicitly understood in contradistinction to the animalian or feral
child’s rational deﬁciency.27 Classiﬁed as the orphans of civilization, native peoples were
conceptually and legally precluded from making claims to land. In virtually all European
legal codes, as in British common law, those born out of wedlock and therefore without
parentage ‘can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody; and sometimes
called ﬁlius nullius’.28 The colonial categorization of natives as the children of no one and
inheritors of nothing is mirrored in the categorization of the land as having no inherent
claim upon it, as terra nullius. Indigenous peoples were situated as feral humans (homo
ferus) and deﬁned legally as wards of the paternalistic sovereign whose executive in the
United States, the Great White Father, stood as the representative of settler democracy
and civilization.29
Thus, premodern societies are not simply like children – they are not merely analogous –
for they act according to the same crude cognitive processes or patterns.30 Though I will
be dealing mainly with the structure of settler colonialism in the New World, there are
strong parallels elsewhere. As post-colonial scholar Uday Singh Mehta observes, almost
all non-Western peoples have ‘from the outset been coded as a child’.31 Childhood reﬂects
64 T. ROLLO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
rit
ish
 C
olu
mb
ia 
Li
br
ary
] a
t 1
3:3
5 2
6 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
‘the ﬁxed point underlying the various imperial imperatives of education, forms of govern-
ance, and the alignment with progress’.32 As Edward Said has noted, in the global colonial
imagination the ‘Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”.’ Likewise, the
‘Arabs are made to rejoin the very broad designation, common to modern anthropological
thought, of the childish primitive.’33 The modern age is thus an age in a very literal sense.
Modernity is the age that gives rise to the possibility of individual liberty, democracy,
science, technology, etc.
Ancient Greek and Roman coloniality
Philosophers, playwrights, and historians in ancient Greece tended to associate labour
with dependence and necessity, a degraded state of being for which the child stood as
a perennial archetype.34 Physical and material dependency – vulnerability – was resented
and considered indicative of inferior virtue and constitution.35 Writers from Greek antiquity
lamented the miserable helplessness of infants and the absolute dependence of chil-
dren.36 Throughout this historical period, most young boys and girls lived in conditions
of servitude or slavery as legal and political non-persons.37 It is altogether unsurprising,
then, that the Greeks employed the same word for both child and slave (pais) since servi-
tude was considered the natural condition of those whose lack of reason rendered them
incapable of organizing their own lives.38 It was Aristotle’s view that slaves, women, and
children are naturally excluded from political life on the grounds that they possessed
deﬁcient forms of reason and speech (logos).39 But while there was debate even among
ancient thinkers concerning the validity of natural slavery for adults or the natural subor-
dination of women, the natural slavery and subordination of children was self-evident.
Unlike slavery or the subjugation of women, there is no historical record from the
period suggesting that the legitimacy of excluding and dominating children was ever a
question. This complete erasure suggests that misopedy was foundational to Greek politi-
cal thought and practice in a way that was not even true of hierarchies rooted in slavery or
gender.
The unquestionable natural subordination of the child was the backdrop against which
those who were not subject to civilizing instruction were conceptualized as feral children,
peoples trapped in a bestial state without language or reason.40 The identiﬁcation of pol-
itical agency with reasoned speech (logos) had the effect of deﬁning politics itself in con-
tradistinction to the child, a formulation that would prove central to Greek justiﬁcations of
empire. The Greeks were fond of mocking incomprehensible speech, be it the babble of a
baby or the babble of a non-Greek speaker.41 Indeed, the terms baby, babble, and barbar-
ian derive from the same Indo-European root ba ba, connoting the incomprehensible
speech of the infant (likewise, ‘infant’ from the Latin in fans, connoting ‘without
speech’).42 The invasion and enslavement of ‘barbarian’ cultures, ﬁt only to be governed,
was an extrapolation of the violence and servitude suited to the degraded ﬁgure of the
child.
It is also in Roman antiquity that we ﬁnd precedent for the legal and political classiﬁ-
cation of adults as children. In ancient Rome, the legal principle of paterfamilias positioned
children as property of their father based on the idea that children are dependants who
cannot exercise genuine agency.43 The status of child was not related to age. Even as chil-
dren grew into adults they were not free until their father died or they underwent the
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onerous legal process of emancipation similar to the manumission of slaves.44 With child-
hood conceived as a category of dependence, irrespective of age, labour and childhood
become inextricably linked irrespective of class. The adult children of wealthy citizens
were no less the property of their fathers than the adult children of non-citizens.
Indeed, when Roman census-takers came across parents who did not meet minimum
property requirements for citizenship, the parent’s children – in Latin, proles – were
then listed as their contribution. The Roman term proletarius denoted the lowest class
of propertyless peoples whose sole contribution was to produce children who could
serve as future labourers and slaves.45 The legal status of free children shifted over
time, but for much of the Roman era fathers held absolute power (potestas) over both chil-
dren and slaves in the household. A father was entitled to organize the marriage and
reproductive life of both his children and his slaves, or even to kill them.46 Powers over
life and death (vitae necisque potestas) were legally recognized even if they were rarely
exercised, especially after the Christianization of Rome in the fourth century when violence
towards children was acknowledged as in a different category than violence towards
slaves. Despite some legal differences between free children and enslaved children, vio-
lence against free children was still considered a necessary feature of education, stern
even if not excessive, irrespective of class.47
Well over 1000 years before New World contact with Indigenous peoples, Western pol-
itical thought and practice were predicated on the political exclusion and violent edu-
cation of both children and adults who were categorized as children. And although
empire came to be justiﬁed with reference to the defective reason of non-Greek ‘barbar-
ians’ who, like children, were naturally servile, a conception of linear civilizational progress
had not yet emerged.
Medieval Christianity coloniality
New classes of scholars who stood as beneﬁciaries of misopedy vociferously championed
economic and political life deﬁned in opposition to children, along with their use as
labourers. To be a scholar was, in a literal sense, to have free time to deliberate (from
the Greek skhole), for it was in the leisure time afforded in part by the labour of children
that men could study, deliberate, and cultivate their newly realized and deﬁnitively human
form of freedom and agency. In the medieval period, scholastic practice was associated
with religious study of the Bible and its commentators. Soon after the fourth-century
monk Pelagius’ argument that children were not born with ‘original sin’ was declared a
heresy most religious scholars proclaimed that the stain of sin incurred by Adam and
Eve in the childhood of mankind is recapitulated in every child born thereafter. Salvation
is dependent, therefore, on a life given over to the word of God (Logos) and it is only
through education in faith that mankind progresses spiritually from a state of worldly
sin towards heavenly grace.
Medieval social and political orders remained to a large extent an outgrowth of the
Roman legal doctrine of paterfamilias,which early Christian thinkers reconceived as a theo-
logical principle. The Christian order came to depicted as a human family bound in a divi-
nely ordained hierarchical order, a great chain of being with the King as representative of
God standing as father to his earthly family. Building off the Greek and Roman viliﬁcation
of bestial childhood, children were situated at the lowest levels of creation, below adult
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human beings and just above the animals. Civilizational discourses began to emerge as
Christian thinkers introduced the idea that humanity itself advances along a linear histori-
cal trajectory. In the fourth century, Augustine became one of the ﬁrst thinkers to reject the
cyclical Hellenistic view of history – the view that that there is nothing new under the sun
and time is a recursive succession of growth and deterioration.48 Augustine’s key inno-
vation was to understand the birth of Jesus as a singular, unprecedented, unrepeatable
event, and the ﬁnal days of judgement as the ultimate terminus of Man’s spiritual progress.49
Augustine’s vision of progress did not take place on earth, however. In the fall of Rome,
Augustine saw proof that civilizations on earth were destined to go through natural stages
of birth, ﬂowering, and decay. Our worldly existence was to be contrasted with our pro-
gress in faith towards the City of God as a ﬁnal spiritual destination.50 The universal con-
dition of original sin entails that mankind cannot do it alone. God’s providence is required
since humanity exists in a state of shameful childhood precisely because original sin is
embodied in every generation born to earth. The Greco-Roman traditions of discipline
and education were now in the service of the child’s deliverance from degrading worldli-
ness (original sin) into the salvation of spiritual maturity.51 J.B. Bury, a historian of the idea
of progress, observed that in the Augustinian spiritual scheme a doctrine of historical pro-
gress was not conceivable: ‘as long as the human species endures on earth, every child will
be born naturally evil and worthy of punishment, a moral advance of humanity to perfec-
tion is plainly impossible’.52 As one writer summarized the medieval Christian view of chil-
dren: ‘A child was not believed to be truly human simply by birthright; he was a creature in
search of humanity – unpredictable, capable of animal indolence, selﬁshness, and sava-
gery.’53 Looking into the past, however, Augustine optimistically suggests that the devel-
opment of mankind has been inextricably linked to the progression out of childhood
towards a devout maturity in faith.54
Contact
It was in the context of the medieval history of child brutality and enslavement that ﬁrst
contact was made with Indigenous peoples in the New World. Within decades, native
peoples were subject to violent dispossession and enslavement. In 1532, the Catholic phi-
losopher Francisco de Vitoria offered a defence of Indigenous peoples, arguing that they
should be free from slavery and permitted to own property and trade that property with
Spain. Vitoria was also clear, however, that Spain legitimately asserts sovereignty over
native lands. Indigenous peoples, while ‘not wholly unintelligent’, are nevertheless ‘little
short of that condition, and so are unﬁt to found or administer a lawful State up to the
standard required by human and civil claims’.55 Speciﬁcally, the step of imposing colonial
order is necessary when Indigenous peoples are found to lack adult capacities for reason:
‘sovereigns would be bound to take it, just as if the natives were infants’.56 In keeping with
the categorization of adults as children, which dates back to at least ancient Rome, native
adults were in Vitoria’s estimation legitimately seen as children if they exhibit the same
deﬁciency of reason.
Vitoria’s very early categorization of Indigenous peoples as children is linked to his
defence of a natural right of European powers to travel, trade, and occupy terra nullius.
He formulates the law of nations (ius gentium) such that Indigenous peoples are prohibited
from rejecting trade and commerce with Spain, and Spain is under no obligation to cease
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exploration, settlement, and trade. Indeed, since so many native peoples had been suc-
cessfully converted to Christianity, Vitoria suggests that it would be ‘neither expedient
nor lawful for our sovereign to wash his hands entirely of the administration of the
lands in question’.57 In Vitoria’s inﬂuential view, Indigenous leadership is bound by the
law of nations to accept trade with Spain, for whom ‘if it be necessary, in order to preserve
their right, that they should go to war, they may lawfully do so’.58 By invoking the hom-
ology of individual and civilizational progress through education of the sinful child in
faith towards salvation, Vitoria disqualiﬁes native peoples and their claims to nationhood
on the grounds that they have proven incapable of supporting the ‘human and civil claims’
required to uphold property rights and markets. Misopedy, then, is the pretence upon
which Vitoria naturalizes Spain’s assertion of sovereignty ‘as if the natives were infants’.
In less than a century following ﬁrst contact ‘the image of the Indian as a natural slave
was replaced by that of the Indian as child’.59 In 1537, Pope Paul III issued a papal bull, Sub-
limis Deus, declaring that Indigenous peoples of the Americans could not be enslaved
because they were in fact fully human. The decree also stipulated that Indigenous
peoples could not be disposed of their property, which did nothing to restore territories
back to sovereign Indigenous nations.
In 1547, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda published ‘On the Reasons for the Just War among
the Indians’ wherein he repeated the Greek and Medieval homology which extrapolated
the legitimacy of colonial rule from the idea that ‘the rational part of the soul rules and
directs the irrational part, which submits and obeys’:
The man rules over the woman, the adult over the child, the father over his children. That is to
say, the most powerful and most perfect rule over the weakest and most imperfect. This same
relationship exists among men, there being some who by nature are masters and others who
by nature are slaves. Those who surpass the rest in prudence and intelligence, although not in
physical strength, are by nature the masters.60
In 1550, reports of brutal violence and enslavement of native peoples reached the King
of Spain, Charles V, who then initiated debate involving Catholic thinkers as to whether
Indigenous peoples were natural slaves or fully human. Sepúlveda’s opposition in what
came to be known as the Valladolid debate was Bartolomé de las Casas, who largely
echoed Vitoria’s defence of Indigenous peoples. Las Casas argued that Indigenous
nations often exhibited spiritual and political maturity at least on par with Europe’s
ancient civilizations. Although a group of ‘Indians’ may still qualify as barbarian in the
formal sense that they might be illiterate, this was no less true of the English nation at
one point in history. Las Casas contends that the absence of reason or the degeneration
of reason can be found in both European and ‘Indian’ societies and was therefore ‘acciden-
tal and not natural’.61
Far from rejecting the civilizational homology deployed by Sepúlveda, Las Casas
afﬁrmed it so as to argue that some Indigenous peoples did in fact (or, through education,
could potentially) qualify as mature societies. Such a defence stands as the pre-cursor of
Lockean idea that there is nothing inherently defective about the reasoning capacities of
the ‘Indian’, but rather, the absence of reason is an accident of history that can and must
be addressed through education. Subsequent justiﬁcations of settler colonial expansion
would also echo Vitoria’s assertion that Spain had an obligation to establish its sovereignty
and administer over lands in order to cultivate the legal conditions of trade and
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commerce. By the late sixteenth century, Spain formally shifted from a discourse of legit-
imate conquest to ‘paciﬁcation’ of land and Indigenous peoples, though in practice the
brutal treatment of the ‘Indian’ changed very little.
Enlightenment and romantic coloniality
In the centuries that followed, the traditional hierarchies constituting medieval social and
political order were slowly eroded by the rise of Protestantism, radical interpretations of
the Christian ideal of equality under God, the successes of scientiﬁc inquiry and the amas-
sing of private fortunes. Education in faith, once posited as the process of Man’s progress
and the hallmark of European maturity was increasingly associated with childish supersti-
tion. Enlightenment thinkers declared that the light of human reason was poised to van-
quish the darkness of childish faith as the proper foundation of political order and the
engine of civilization progress. A core idea of the emerging humanism was that intellectual
improvement as opposed to spiritual improvement was the main driver of historical pro-
gress. As a result, education in faith was gradually replaced with a more secular, humanis-
tic, and science-based curriculum.
The self-understanding of settler colonial powers would shift during the era of Enlight-
enment, most notably in its break with the Roman doctrine of paterfamilias and its Chris-
tian manifestation in the divine right of Kings. Still, there were some notable ﬁnal attempts
to salvage the monarchical vision of sovereignty. In 1680, Robert Filmer would produce
one of the last great defences of the medieval homology between adulthood and civiliza-
tion, asserting that a King’s right to rule his domain and subjects was a direct expression of
the father’s right to rule over the household and child (a premise with which, he Filmer
puzzled, no one seemed to have a problem):
I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man else, can be free from subjection to
their parents. And this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority, by the
ordination of God himself.62
In response, a distinction was devised in political thought between parental authority
and political authority. In the work of social contract theorists, the legitimacy of political
authority was seen as contingent on reasoned consent.63 In an ingenious theoretical
move, Thomas Hobbes argued that the violence of political disorder which results from
fractured sovereignty, the infamous ‘state of nature’, is the basis of our reasoned
consent to absolute sovereignty.64 Likewise with respect to parental authority, reasoned
consent may be implied since every family is always ‘a little Monarchy’.65 In the work of
Hobbes, not only does consent establish the legitimacy of political sovereignty, consent
can be presumed rather than actual.
It is in the work of John Locke that we ﬁnd the most lasting and inﬂuential shift in the
civilizational homology between child and native. Locke rejected both Hobbes’ and
Filmer’s defences of absolute sovereignty, arguing in a move reminiscent of Vitoria that
political rule exists to preserve the property rights and commercial institutions already
established by civil society. Citizens consent only insofar as political rule is governed by
reason and they may also reform it whenever it fails to protect civil society. A complication
arose, however, as Locke’s defence of the reasoned consent seemed to imply that parents
did not have a right to govern children who had not (or could not) consent. Locke follows
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Hobbes, arguing that children are born free and rational insofar as they have the potential
to exercise capacities for reason.66 Whereas the principle of paterfamilias designated chil-
dren as the disposable property of parents even into adulthood (as subjects are to Kings),
Locke argued that children are God’s property.67 Moreover, he claimed that parental rule
over children was temporary, that parents had a natural duty to educate children in the
use of reason and parental authority ended once children became reasoning adults.
Locke’s children are not respected on their own terms but only insofar as they are becom-
ing something other than children. Rights are extended not to children qua children, but to
potential adults who exist only temporarily in the imperfect state of childhood.68
This new enlightened approach preserved the developmental homology of earlier
epochs. Locke’s work reﬂects a critical shift from classical misopedy, according to which
the bestial child is property of the parent, to the Enlightenment misopedy wherein the
bestial child is given the status of a ward under the guardianship and protection of the
parent. Locke does not appear to attribute naturally defective reason to Indigenous
peoples. Rather, ‘Indians’ were depicted as no more or less potentially rational than Eur-
opeans.69 As children of civilization, Indigenous peoples are not inherently inferior, but
rather, temporarily inferior. And herein we can identify the central logic of modern colonial
capitalism. Not unlike Vitoria, Locke’s concern was to show that God bestowed mankind
with the potential for reason and that he granted the world ‘to the Industrious and
Rational’.70 As long there was enough land for everyone, no person is entitled to object
to or interfere with the property and industry of another. No doubt, Locke’s deep commer-
cial interests in European colonies also informed his view that Indigenous peoples who
objected to colonial dispossession were intentionally situating themselves on the wrong
side of the political/childhood binary. In most cases, however, the solution to Indigenous
resistance was a more robust commitment to education. Colonial political thought in the
seventeenth century, as exempliﬁed in the work of Locke, couched the homology of pro-
gress from bestial child to rational adult in a more secular terms of consent and education.
The link between private property, commerce, political agency, and salvation that we ﬁnd
in Christian thinkers like Vitoria is gradually associated with education in reason. The con-
ceptual and institutional hallmarks of modernity take form in the context of the colonial
categorization of Indigenous peoples as feral children of the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment had its critics, of course, and given the centrality of childhood to
European thought many of these critics sought to reconceptualizing the ﬁgure of the
child. While it appears on the surface that a sense of dignity was being associated with
childhood itself, the ﬁgure of the child was not removed from its conceptualization as
the tragic antithesis of the emerging modern condition. In general, childhood animality
became the object of nostalgia and fetishization rather than overt disdain: ‘Children’s
essential animality has sometimes been viewed as problematic; at other times the
animal nature of children has been idealized. The equation of child with animal
remains.’71 Resisting what they considered a stiﬂing culture of rationalism and a political
ﬁxation on a utopian political future based on reason, Romantic writers valorized the
child’s free, spontaneous and creative way of being as indicative of humanity’s paradise
lost. The inherent superiority of mature modes of modern freedom and agency were
not fundamentally challenged. Modernity is characterized by the loss of childhood inno-
cence, natural freedom, and connection to nature, but the loss is inevitable and indeed
necessary for moral progress towards the political freedom realized in the constitution
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of civil and political society. The romanticized child is thus the centre of a tragic story of
lost human authenticity and our alienation from the world.72
These themes were most famously explored in the work of J.J. Rousseau. In Discourse on
the Origins of Inequality, for example, Rousseau claims that children and parents would, in
the state of nature, have no relationship of mutual responsibility.73 Accordingly, we learn
in The Social Contract that despite its ﬂaws, modern society is essential for moral improve-
ment and the highest forms of human freedom and sociality.74 Likewise, Rousseau’s cele-
brated work on children, Emile, was not intended to be an education manual but rather a
lament on the impossibility of raising children to be both free and functional within
modern society.75 In civilizational terms, Man’s original freedom – his childhood – must
be sacriﬁced in order to pursue education. The child’s courageous and impulsive state
of playful being is simply incongruent with what bourgeois artists and intellectuals saw
as constraining yet inevitable strictures of modern civilization.76 If a child somehow
goes without education they are left in a feral or natural state of being that is identical
in many ways to that of the ‘Indian’. Sankar Muthu observes that Rousseau at times
‘manages to equate savages (understood as the earliest purely natural individuals of his
conjectural history), the “Savage Nations” of the New World, and feral children (such as
the “little savage of Hanover”) as “natural creatures”’.77
By the eighteenth century, romantic philosophical and literary depictions of childhood
were reﬂected in tropes of native peoples, epitomized in the myth of the ‘noble savage’. In
their classiﬁcation as children, following the social contract formulation, the consent of the
native ward was always regarded as form of hypothetical or implied consent to the sover-
eign understood as parent or guardian. Unless the native had demonstrably matured
through education, as evidenced by their industriousness and enthusiastic embrace of
systems of private property, trade, and commerce, the explicit consent of native
peoples was not required. At best, the sovereign as guardian had a self-imposed duty
to consult with underdeveloped native communities and hold their wealth in trust,
though in the absence of consultation the sovereign was nevertheless obliged to
author decisions that were in the best interests of the native (again, according to the sover-
eign). Any assertion of jurisdiction over land on the part of the ‘Indian’ was interpreted as a
failure of colonial education, a regression into childhood, and an affront to standards of
civilized governance.
Modernity coloniality
The contemporary construction of native peoples as feral children has not changed much
from its articulation by the social contract theorists. Since then, however, the settler colo-
nial homology of civilizational progress has accrued a veneer of academic and scientiﬁc
legitimacy that bears mention. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a
stages view of progress coalesced in the philosophical work of Kant, Hegel, Mill, and
Comte that explicitly premised historical, biological, and sociological understandings of
cultural evolution on the development of the child. In his formative essay, ‘An Answer
to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?’, for example, Kant argues the Enlightenment
is marked by ‘man’s release from his self incurred immaturity’.78 The terms in which he
deﬁnes immaturity are telling: ‘the inability to use one’s own understanding without
the guidance of another’.79 Kant’s notion of immaturity preserves virtually unaltered the
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political/childhood binary born in Greek and Roman antiquity and it is central to his vision,
and subsequent visions, of civilizational progress. The German word translated here as
immaturity (sometimes as ‘tutelage’) is unmündikeit, which has as its root mund, or
mouth, and connotes the ability to speak for oneself.80 While man exists in a state of imma-
turity – without speech – we are merely ‘passive citizens’.81
Kant and his contemporaries are often criticized for espousing racist positions at the
same time as they celebrate the timeless and universal nature of human rights. The
issue here is the timelessness and universality of the process of maturation. The medieval
homology heavily informs Kant’s view that ‘children ought to be educated, not for the
present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner
which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man’.82 Independence
must be learned, according to Kant, lest one end up like the Indigenous peoples of what is
now Tahiti, ‘who remain children all their lives’.83 He argued that the absence of a civil state
indicates a lack of, or rejection of, reason and a threat to civilized people which justiﬁes
pre-emptive ‘hostile action’.84 Like Vitoria, he sanctions violence against Indigenous
peoples who, as ‘immature children’, violate the dictates of reason, as manifest in their
rejection of private property and liberal rights.85 The identical homology is carried
through in the work of John Stuart Mill, who wrote in On Liberty and elsewhere that Indi-
genous societies, which are to be considered children, have no rights to bodily integrity or
freedom from violence.86 Mehta perfectly summarizes the colonial mandate expressed by
Mill and others in the context of colonial India: ‘India is a child for which the empire offers
the prospect of legitimate and progressive parentage and toward which Britain, as a
parent, is similarly obligated and competent.’87
In the hands of Hegel, the idea that shifts in political organization signal the historical
progress of reason reached unprecedented heights of philosophical abstraction. For
Hegel, consciousness (Mind or Spirit) is a rational force progressing from its childhood
through historical stages towards maturity.88 This dialectical passage through stages is a
story of maturation and growth, which Hegel believes positions Europe, and speciﬁcally
modern Germany, at the apex of historical progress.89 The individual and the whole are
inextricably linked in the progress of Spirit. Indeed, the potential maturity of adults is in
part restricted by the maturity of the society into which they are born.90 Reason progresses
by building on the past and bootstrapping philosophical self-understanding through gen-
erations, which is an auspicious circumstance for the children of Europe who inherited
centuries of Western civilization; their deliverance from savage state is virtually guaranteed
as a result of being born into societies representing the historical vanguard of human
progress.
The generations of intellectuals that followed Hegel were even more explicit about the
structural relationship between civilizational and individual progress. In the mid-nine-
teenth century, Auguste Comte, the self-proclaimed father of sociology, argued that
societies progress through three main stages of intellectual maturity: theological, meta-
physical, and positive.91 Comte is careful to clarify that there is no mere metaphor at
work in the suggestion that the progress of societies mirrors the advancement out of
a state of childhood. To have a theological or metaphysical worldview is precisely what
it means to be a child. Comte’s ‘stages’ theory of human progress is important insofar
as it served as the template for scientiﬁc theories of natural progress. With the publishing
of Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species in 1859, the ideas of natural selection and
72 T. ROLLO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
rit
ish
 C
olu
mb
ia 
Li
br
ary
] a
t 1
3:3
5 2
6 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
evolutionary change began to shift intellectual discourse. Europe already understood itself
according to an increasingly secular view of moral and political progress (in which Europe
was the obvious vanguard). Darwin was familiar with Comte’s philosophy, and the emer-
ging scientiﬁc vision of biological adaptation provided an even ﬁrmer empirical foun-
dation for doctrines of progress.
Within the burgeoning social scientiﬁc disciplines, childhood and child societies would
be ﬁxed as a stage of amorphous, irrational, savage, and even criminal state of being.92 In
sciences of the mind, ﬁgures such as Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, and Lawr-
ence Kohlberg proposed that children move through stages from self-centred animal
instinct and desires towards abstract reasoning. Piaget advanced what he termed a
‘genetic epistemology’ according to which childhood before the age of seven was charac-
terized by animism, or the belief that inanimate objects possessed a kind of agency.93 The
view that Indigenous peoples were equivalent to European children around the age of
seven was common.94 In 1979, the anthropologist C.R. Hallpike applied Piaget’s develop-
mental stages theory directly to Indigenous peoples, arguing, as one reviewer put it, ‘that
the collective representations of illiterate, unschooled, rural peoples are expressions of
preoperational thought processes characteristic of two- to seven-year-old Western chil-
dren, as described by Piaget’.95 The child is the cipher of the primitive, to the extent
that our understanding of the savage can be discerned directly through the study of chil-
dren. To that end, Freud sets out in his book Totem and Taboo ‘to deduce the original
meaning of totemism from the vestiges of it remaining in childhood – from the hints of
it which emerge in the course of the growth of our own children’.96
Modern colonial thinkers inherited the conceptual legacy of misopedy. Early NewWorld
politicians, missionaries, and scientists, fought for exclusion from the political domain and
education of the savage child embodied in the ‘Indian’. The ﬁrst Secretary of the Smithso-
nian Institution, scientist Joseph Henry, claimed that the art of Indigenous peoples demon-
strated that ‘the savage is but a child in intellectual development’.97 Educators like Myron
Eells agreed. He wrote in an Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners in the
United States that ‘in education, morals, food, houses, general civilization, and Christianity,
he is a child. As a child he needs a home and a school’.98 Likewise, in a debate in the Cana-
dian House of Commons over a bill that would enfranchise Indigenous peoples, Minister
J.F. Lister laid bare the structure of misopedy at the heart of Canadian colonial project: ‘It
should be rejected because the Indians are infants in the eye of the law, and are in a state
of tutelage, under the control of the Government.’99
In this section, I have brieﬂy tracked the way an ancient distinction between the animal
child and the fully human adult gave rise to a homology between individual and civiliza-
tional progress. The coloniality childhood was responsible for structuring both medieval
Christian and Enlightenment justiﬁcations of settler colonial dispossession. The purpose
of the review was to illustrate the foundational role that the conceptualization of native
peoples as ‘Indian’ by way of their categorization as children has played in disqualifying
them as political agents capable of forming nations with legitimate claims to land. In
addition, this history is essential to an understanding of how the civilizational homology
established a self-imposed obligation on the part of the sovereign state as parent or guar-
dian to educate the ‘Indian’.
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Conclusion: confronting the coloniality of childhood
Exploring the coloniality of childhood at the root of Indigenous dispossession and coerced
education is indispensable to the task of interpreting and addressing present day settler
colonialism, especially with respect to the former British colonies that deployed the hom-
ology such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Within these states,
ideals of self-government, consent, and consultation have emerged as dominant guides in
addressing the legacy of settler colonialism. The ideals are, as many have observed, inher-
ently framed in terms of adaptation to colonial economic orders. Glen Coulthard explains,
for example, that we inevitably ﬁnd recognition and self-government predicated on Indi-
genous ability to participate in the market economy.100 In approaching coloniality in iso-
lation from the conceptual origins discussed above, we may proceed disconnected from
the speciﬁc mechanisms by which native peoples’ claims to political and territorial sover-
eignty are disqualiﬁed. The standard of civilizational maturity, formulated at the outset by
Vitoria according to the medieval binary opposition between child and adult, is always
already framed in terms of adherence to regimes of private property and commerce.
Thus, modern settler colonialism persists in part by ensnaring Indigenous peoples in a
self-defeating performance of adulthood. Native peoples are compelled to demonstrate
intellectual maturity and sophistication in order to establish the possibility and therefore
the necessity of their explicit consent (rather than simply implied consent) to the plans of
dominant state and market actors. This posture replicates the Enlightenment notion of a
scale of civilizational progress upon which the maturity of Indigenous communities is
indexed to the cultivation of literacy and marketable skills. As Fanon reminds us, there
are hazards in appealing to the intellect as the deﬁning feature of humanity: ‘if philosophy
and intelligence are invoked to proclaim the equality of men, they have also been
employed to justify the extermination of men’.101 Some individuals and communities
will be less schooled and therefore less civilized than others, which has the effect of stra-
tifying Indigenous communities, fostering competition among them, and justifying state
interventions into the lives of Indigenous families. The modern call to end child labour,
likewise, was not intended as a liberation of children from their status as deﬁcient and
ignorant. Rather, the call was framed as a way of rescuing children from becoming perma-
nently ensnared in their naturally degraded condition of ignorance and servitude. This was
true both for child labourers in Europe as well as for children in Indigenous communities.
As I hope to have shown, many settler colonial dynamics of dispossession cannot be
fully understood when analysed through traditional lenses of race and gender since
these do not interrogate the fundamental degradation of children and childhood at the
root of civilizational precepts such as Manifest Destiny, terra nullius, the white man’s
burden and the Doctrine of Discovery. In the work of historical thinkers such as Schiller
and Parkman, we see that the violence and exploitation of settler colonial institutions
can proceed irrespective of race. European peoples understood and continue to under-
stand themselves, not as inherently exceptional, but as having already undergone the
violent education in faith and reason that they are now morally obliged to impose on
non-European peoples. To fully comprehend the dispossession of lands, removal of chil-
dren from native communities, forced schooling, the shift from religious to secular school-
ing, as well as the host of institutions designed to assimilate and destroy Indigenous
cultures, it is necessary to recognize that the image of the native as ‘Indian’ is not simply a
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racial construction but an identiﬁcation of native peoples with savage childhood.102 In this
light, strategies for decolonization would do well to coalesce around a more fundamental
challenge to the Western homology that situates children, and by extension native
peoples, as the perpetual ‘Other’ of modernity. Challenging the coloniality of childhood
may be vital to the reassertion of Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty.103
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